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Abstract
COVID-19 is unique in that it is the first global pandemic occurring amidst a crowded information environment that has
facilitated the proliferation of misinformation on social media. Dangerous misleading narratives have the potential to
disrupt ‘official’ information sharing at major government announcements. Using an interrupted time-series design, we
test the impact of the announcement of the first UK lockdown (8–8.30 p.m. 23 March 2020) on short-term trends of
misinformation on Twitter. We utilise a novel dataset of all COVID-19-related social media posts on Twitter from the
UK 48 hours before and 48 hours after the announcement (n¼ 2,531,888). We find that while the number of tweets
increased immediately post announcement, there was no evidence of an increase in misinformation-related tweets. We
found an increase in COVID-19-related bot activity post-announcement. Topic modelling of misinformation tweets
revealed four distinct clusters: ‘government and policy’, ‘symptoms’, ‘pushing back against misinformation’ and ‘cures
and treatments’.
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Introduction
The ‘infodemic’ pandemic
Public health crises throughout human history have
frequently seen the diffusion of misleading or inaccu-
rate information (Mawdsley, 2020). The COVID-19
pandemic has introduced new dimensions to this old
problem through being the first global pandemic occur-
ring an information age which provides an environ-
ment of online platforms facilitating fast information
sharing opportunities across large populations.
Misinformation – defined here as any news, rumour,
source or information that is misleading, inaccurate or
not true and shared without clear intent to cause harm
(where intent to harm was intended, this is often
defined as disinformation) – has previously been iden-
tified as a global public health threat (Larson, 2018).
Evidence has demonstrated that misinformation can
spread both quicker and further along social networks
than truthful information (Vosoughi et al., 2018). The
potential for ‘viral’ misinformation, especially with few
effective strategies to act against the constantly evolv-
ing nature of content, places considerable burdens on
governments in dealing with the disease or may encour-
age individuals to act against their best interests
(Pulido et al., 2020).
The close connectivity of humans through technical
networks and a plethora of available information sour-
ces has enabled both official and unofficial COVID-19
information to thrive together in the same virtual envi-
ronments, both competing for the attention of the audi-
ence. There are vast volumes of information and data
available on the internet, most of which is unregulated
(Swire-Thompson and Lazer, 2020). Medical and
health information is particularly prevalent and often
of low quality (Daraz et al., 2019). Social media net-
works contribute to these processes as users can share
unvetted content due to the lack of a gatekeeping pro-
cess, with organisations often slow to respond to con-
trolling. With some population groups increasingly
using the internet as their go-to source for health-
related information (Daraz et al., 2019; Ofcom, 2020),
closer scrutiny and analysis of how national govern-
ment announcements are received online, both proac-
tively and reactively, is therefore appropriate.
The uncertain, fast-moving, dynamic and unprece-
dented nature of the pandemic has increased the need
for immediate information over the progress of
COVID-19, its drivers and potential solutions (Pulido
et al., 2020). This has been compounded with people
spending greater times at home during social distancing
measures (Yang et al., 2020). This diffusion of infor-
mation is difficult to control especially when people
want to stay informed (Cinelli et al., 2020). We define
these processes of digitally enabled information conta-
gion as the ‘infodemic’.
How misinformation influences public health and
health behaviours is not well understood (Swire-
Thompson and Lazer, 2020). Misinformation is pow-
erful because it plays on emotions, often through
diverse means (Pennycook et al., 2020). Deceit can be
most effective when viewed as plausible or paired with
poor or pseudo-scientific material (Pelizza, 2020).
Individuals often seek out information that support
their views (i.e., confirmation bias), which can result
in polarisation of attitudes and toxicifcation of online
spaces (Cinelli et al., 2020; Schwarz et al., 2016). Social
media plays an important role in how people react and
respond to the pandemic, which can be compounded
by algorithms promoting echo chambers of informa-
tion sharing. ‘Superspreader’ moments can occur espe-
cially when items are shared or amplified by social
influencers or accounts with large followings (e.g.,
celebrities or politicians) (Gruzd and Mai, 2020).
Emerging evidence about the scale of misinformation
related to COVID-19
Worries about the role of misinformation influencing
the course of COVID-19 have seen considerable effort
towards monitoring the scale, reach and influence of
misinformation. Studies estimating the scale of misin-
formation across internet technologies suggest encour-
aging signs that truthful information is far more
prevalent than misinformation (Cinelli et al., 2020;
Evanega et al., 2020; Ferrara, 2020; Pulido et al.,
2020; Yang et al., 2020). This has not necessarily trans-
lated to low reach, with one UK survey estimating that
half of people having come across some form of mis-
information (Ofcom, 2020).
The most common types of misinformation tend to
focus on cures or treatment (Evanega et al., 2020),
including growing anti-vaccine movements (Burki,
2020), likely influenced by broader fears and anxiety
of a newly discovered disease. Conspiracy theories
have gained prominence, including one hoax centred
around the hashtag #FilmYourHospital gaining
99,000 posts on Twitter (Gruzd and Mai, 2020).
Other frequent content includes themes around the
causes of COVID-19, mode of transmission and gener-
al uncertainty caused by unclear government messages
on policies or actions (Kyriakidou et al., 2020). These
combined forms of misinformation can be dangerous
through disrupting preventative efforts to contain the
spread of the disease. Bots – defined here as co-
ordinated internet agents that simulate human activity
to share content – have also played an important role,
with greater likelihood of sharing misinformation
(Ferrara, 2020; Yang et al., 2020).
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The low prevalence of misinformation has not nec-
essarily translated to few harms. While measuring the
specific impacts of misinformation can be difficult,
there has been observable impacts on populations.
Panic buying of food and household items were com-
monplace prior to initial lockdowns in many nations
(Mao, 2020). In Liverpool (UK), 5G masts were set on
fire following fears they were transmitting COVID-19
following conspiracy theories and disinformation
(BBC, 2020). Rioting occurred in Ukraine following
social media posts about citizens being evacuated
from China (Miller, 2020). These large-scale events
co-incide with smaller and incremental erosions of
trust that undermine responses to COVID-19.
Misinformation has also been used to discriminate or
justify exclusion of people. For example, discussions in
the US around how different racial groups may be
immune to COVID-19 due to melanin levels (Pelizza,
2020).
Misinformation influencing policy narratives
When faced with an uncertain, unknown and unprece-
dented pandemic, the need for clear public health com-
munication is imperative. Many national governments,
including the UK, instigated daily briefings in the early
stages of the pandemic. The immediate (e.g., 24–
48 hours) response to messages is paramount to
inform a population and avoid confusion.
Misinformation during the early stages of public
health communication can disrupt or harm the process
for sharing clear messages. Human responses to view-
ing or sharing misinformation may interject uncertain-
ty among the population, especially if information
gathering due to broader fears or anxiety demands
immediate answers. Misinformation may lead to pop-
ulations resisting policy decisions or public health
advice, which could disrupt policy or reduce trust in
official announcements. Misinformation can also
appeal to public officials who may integrate content
into the decision making process or amplify the misin-
formation so that it becomes prominent (Pelizza, 2020)
Tackling the spread of misinformation is therefore a
key government priority. The role of misinformation in
reacting to policy announcements is not well under-
stood. There is very little understanding of its associa-
tion with policy announcements, including whether
coordinated and uncoordinated actions respond to crit-
ical moments in policy decision making (Swire-
Thompson and Lazer, 2020). We need to identify
whether there are critical periods to target interventions
co-inciding with major policy announcements to reduce
any potential impact of misinformation in disrupting
the policy process.
‘Infoveillance’ – defined here as systematically utilis-
ing structured and unstructured online health informa-
tion to monitor human responses to public health
events (Eysenbach, 2011) – is a core approach to sup-
port public health policy decision making. Through
combining Data Science, Communication Studies and
Epidemiological techniques, we can harness novel data
structures (including social media records) to under-
stand how to effectively disrupt the spread of misinfor-
mation. However, there have been few applications of
successful infosurveillance with COVID-19. For exam-
ple, most of the initial studies responding to COVID-19
using Twitter data were descriptive simply reporting
what people were tweeting (e.g., Boon-Itt, 2020;
Ferrara, 2020; Kwon et al., 2020; Pulido et al., 2020;
Stella et al., 2020; Stephens, 2020), although some more
rigorous studies exist which tease out specific pathways
about how misinformation operates (Aiello et al., 2020;
De Santis et al., 2020; Gruzd and Mai, 2020). None of
these examples are applied to evaluating a policy
announcement or context. COVID-19 is not going to
be the last pandemic. We need to get smarter at dealing
with misinformation during public health crises to cap-
italise on it in future research and policy.
Aim
The aim of our project is to examine how trends in
misinformation react to a major government policy
announcement during a public health crisis. We utilise
the case study of the UK lockdown announcement on
23 March 2020 (20:00–20:30). Specifically, we tackle
the following research questions: (i) Was the number
of Twitter posts identified as misinformation more or
less common on Twitter up to 48 hours following the
announcement (compared to 48 hours before it)? (ii)
Were tweets from bots more or less frequent post-
announcement? (iii) What misinformation topics were
shared online during the study period and were they
influenced by the announcement?
Methodology
Ethical approval
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the
University of Liverpool’s Research Ethics Committee
(ref: 7654).
Twitter data
Our primary data source was Twitter. Twitter is a
social media platform where users post short messages
(called ‘tweets’) and interact with other users posts.
Twitter is a useful surveillance resource for studying
both the spread of misinformation (Swire-Thompson
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and Lazer, 2020) and responses to infectious diseases
(Tulloch et al., 2019) including COVID-19 (Aiello
et al., 2020; Boon-Itt, 2020; De Santis et al., 2020;
Ferrara, 2020; Gruzd and Mai, 2020; Kwon et al.,
2020; Pulido et al., 2020; Stella et al., 2020; Stephens,
2020). We accessed UK tweets via Twitter’s ‘premium
application programming interface (API)’. Most
research utilising Twitter data for studying responses
to COVID-19 uses the ‘stream API’ which provide real-
time streams of tweets. The ‘stream API’ source does
not capture all tweets and can introduce bias into data-
set, with coverage varying between 1% and 40% of all
tweets over time (Morstatter et al., 2013). Our
approach allows us to interrogate trends among all
tweets (including those of both original content and
retweets) as well as allowing for a greater number of
identification keywords to compile a more detailed
COVID-19-related dataset.
We select all tweets 48 hours before (20.00 21 March
to 20.00 23 March 2020) and 48 hours after the end of
the announcement (20.30 23 March 2020 to 20:30 25
March 2020) as well as during the announcement. We
selected the immediate time period following the
announcement since it represents a critical period for
ensuring consistent messages. Tweets from the UK
were selected from using Twitter’s assigned tweet or
profile location ‘Great Britain (GB)’. Keywords were
selected through expert opinion, review of Twitter’s
own list of COVID-19-related trending terms, as well
as following keywords selected in other Twitter analy-
ses (see Online Appendix for full list). Our analytical
dataset therefore consists only of COVID-19-related
tweets.
Bots have been shown to be associated with sharing
COVID-19 misinformation (Ferrara, 2020), and are
prevalent on Twitter. We utilise the classifier ‘tweetbo-
tornot’ for estimating whether a Twitter account is a
bot or not (Kearney, 2018). The classifier is based on a
trained machine learning model that has learnt to pre-
dict the likelihood of a user being a bot based on sev-
eral features of their account including how often they
tweet, number of followers, profile location and the
content of their previous tweets (e.g., number of hash-
tags, mentions, capital letters). Previous evaluation of
the resource found a 92% model accuracy (Kearney,
2018). We define bots as users with a predicted proba-
bility of 0.5.
Identifying misinformation on Twitter
Measuring misinformation is difficult due to the
diverse and dynamic nature of content. We focus on
identifying sources and tweets identified by ‘fact check-
er’ websites as viral misinformation. Our approach fol-
lows previous studies for measuring misinformation
(Cinelli et al., 2020; Vosoughi et al., 2018). While we
may capture tweets that post satirical content or ridi-
cule misinformation, such tweets also maintain the cir-
culation of misinformation that could be
misinterpreted by others (e.g., satire may be taken seri-
ously within a different cultural setting or if taken out
of context).
We collected all posts displayed on five major fact
checker websites in English (Snopes, Politifact, Health
Feedback, Ferret and Fullfact) that identified posts as
true, false or misleading (neither true nor false). Where
a specific tweet was the source of misinformation, we
identify tweets and retweets based on the tweet’s
unique ID. Where there was an alternative source, we
identify whether URLs within tweets match the source
URL. We then extract the websites that have been
identified as sharing misinformation content (via
News Guard Tech) and identify whether it came from
a website associated with sharing misinformation.
We also identify Twitter accounts associated with
these websites and extract tweets sharing content from
these accounts. Finally, we compiled a list of keywords
from the World health Organization’s (WHO) official
guide to misinformation about COVID-19 and extract
tweets containing these keywords (WHO, 2020).
Statistical analysis
Government announcements act as natural experi-
ments allowing for novel and rigorous study designs
that can approximate causal effects through inter-
rupted time-series designs. We present results from
three time-series modelling approaches to estimate
whether misinformation was more or less prevalent fol-
lowing the announcement. For all analyses, we aggre-
gated data to both hours and minutes and define the
start of the television (TV) announcement (20:00 23
March 2020) as our point of intervention.
First, we model the temporal trend using a multi-
level Negative Binomial regression model following
previous recommendations (Bernal et al., 2017). Our
outcome variable is the count of tweets classified as
misinformation. We predict this using an offset term
in the logged total number of tweets, time and a binary
variable of whether an observation was pre- or post-
announcement (20:00 23 March 2020). An offset term
was included to account for varying number of tweets
over time. Temporal trends were modelled in a flexible
way using B-spline bases accounting for patterns of
seasonality and temporal autocorrelation. A negative
binomial model was fitted to account for over-
dispersion relaxing the restrictive assumption of the
equality between the variance and the mean assumed
by the standard Poisson model (Ver Hoef and Boveng,
2007). We report the b coefficient for the intervention
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estimated effect, which is equivalent to whether there is
a ‘level’ change in the trend denoting whether misinfor-
mation was higher or lower overall following the
announcement (Bernal et al., 2017). Incidence rate
ratios are reported for the coefficient to aid interpreta-
tion, producing the ‘relative’ increase or decrease in
misinformation. We did not hypothesise there was a
change in the relative trend (i.e., slope change) post
announcement.
Second, we utilise Bayesian Structural Time Series
models (Brodersen et al., 2015). Here, we train our
model to predict trends in our outcome (count of mis-
information) pre-intervention to ‘learn’ the underlying
trends. This is achieved through a state-space time-
series model with flexible regression components to
capture the linear trend, seasonality and associations
to coefficients (both fixed and dynamic). A control var-
iable was selected that was highly correlated to our
outcome (total number of tweets) to help improve the
training phase. We note the difficulty in selecting an
appropriate control here (i.e., one that is correlated
to the outcome), especially as it may also be affected
by the intervention itself, but utilise it as the overall
number of tweets is an important denominator that
can explain the extent of possible misinformation.
The method then estimates the counterfactual trend
for our outcome post-intervention, based on observed
trends in our control measures. We report the cumula-
tive absolute (i.e., observed minus expected) and rela-
tive (i.e., ratio for observed over expected) effects for
the post-intervention time period to infer whether there
were an impact on trends.
Third, we use an ‘Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average’ (ARIMA) regression. ARIMA
models are commonly used for modelling time-series
data since they explicitly account for autocorrelation
in time-series observations. We utilise an automatic
ARIMA modelling framework which tests different
combinations of seasonality, lagged effects and tempo-
ral ‘drift’ measures to select a final model that performs
best on model fit statistics (Hyndman and Khandakar,
2008). Models therefore have different specifications to
best accommodate the observed temporal structures in
our data. We report the b coefficient for the interven-
tion estimated effect, which represents the absolute step
or level change in the number of tweets post-
intervention.
With no clear gold-standard approach for what is
the ‘best’ methodology in using three methods we pro-
vide robust triangulation into evidence of any associa-
tions. Using multiple models helps to minimise any
spurious effects or model specific findings that can
lead to misleading results. Each method offers different
approaches and strengths for estimating the impact of
lockdown announcement. The Bayesian Structural
Time Series model employs a counterfactual approach,
whereas the other approaches focus on identifying
changes in trends holistically.
We also classified misinformation tweets during the
whole time period using a Latent Dirichlet Allocation
model to identify ‘topics’ or ‘types’ of tweets based on
the terms included with them (Blei et al., 2003). Raw
tweets were cleaned through removing special charac-
ters and emojis, converting terms to lower case, remov-
ing ‘stop words’ (e.g., the, of, in etc.) and lemmatising
terms (i.e., converting words to their root such as
removing ‘ing’ or ‘ed’).
Analyses were conducted using R and Python soft-




Describing the extent of misinformation pre- and
post-announcement
There were a total of 2,531,888 COVID-19-related
tweets between 20:00 21 March and 20:30 25 March
2020 (Table 1); 51.2% of all COVID-19-related
tweets were made following the announcement. We
identified 20,172 tweets containing misinformation
(0.8% of all COVID-19-related tweets) over the
period, with fewer misinformation tweets post-
announcement (45.8%). Finally, we estimate 858,409
tweets made potentially made by bots over the
period, with slightly more tweets from bots post-
announcement (52.3%). While COVID-19-related
tweets from bots over the period were only slightly
more likely to have contained misinformation
(0.85%), the difference was statistically significant
(v2¼ 12.3, p< 0.001).
Figure 1 plots how the frequency of our three tweet
types varies across the time period. For all COVID-19-
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of sample.
Pre-announcement Post-announcement Total
All tweets 1,236,161 1,295,727 2,531,888
Tweets from bots 409,349 449,060 858,409
Tweets with misinformation 11,135 9037 20,172
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related tweets, there is a cyclical pattern observed
throughout the period, with numbers of tweets higher
during daytime hours and falling during night time.
There is a large increase in the number of COVID-
19-related tweets following the announcement. For
example, we observed a 42% increase in the number
of tweets between 20:00–20:59 (n¼ 51,990) compared
to 19:00-19:59 (n¼ 36,652) on the 23 March and a 38%
increase compared to the 20:00–20:59 (n¼ 37,672) for
the previous day. The large initial change in the trend is
followed by a gradual return to the normal cycle pre-
announcement.
Trends in the amount of misinformation follow a
similar daily cycle to all COVID-19-related tweets,
albeit slightly more erratic due to the smaller numbers
involved. The graph does not appear to show any dis-
cernible increase following the announcement.
For the estimated number of COVID-19-related
tweets from bots, we also find a similar daily cycle in
the number of tweets. There was a clear increase in
COVID-19-related tweets from bots following the
announcement. The trend line also appears higher on
the day of the announcement compared to other days.
Figure A (Online Appendix) investigates this further,
through showing an increase in the percentage of
COVID-19-related tweets estimated from bots on the
day of (23 March 2020) and day after the announce-
ment (24 March 2020). For example, 30.8% of
COVID-19-related tweets a day before the
announcement (22 March 2020) were from bots, com-
pared to 36.4% on the day (23 March 2020) and 37.0%
the following day (24 March 2020). The increase then
declines back to 31.3% on 25 March 2020.
We compared mean engagement (e.g., replies,
retweets, quotes, favourites) of these three types of
tweets. While there were slightly more shares of
COVID-19-related tweets pre-announcement (mean
number of shares¼ 6.11) than compared to post-
announcement (4.95), this difference was not statistical-
ly significant (Welch two sample t-test¼ 1.2, p¼ 0.2).
Mean engagement of tweets estimated to be bots (2.88)
was significantly lower than compared to those that
were not bots (6.59) (t¼ 6.2, p< 0.001). Finally,
tweets identified as misinformation had slightly
higher numbers of tweets shared (7.04) than those not
(5.50); however, this difference was not meaningful
(t¼ 0.41, p¼ 0.7).
Estimating the impact of the announcement
We estimated whether the national lockdown
announcement had an impact on trends in the
number of tweets identified as misinformation.
Table 2 presents the results across our three analytical
models when using hourly data. Findings from the
Negative Binomial regression model suggested there
was a positive impact of the announcement on trends
in misinformation. The estimated effect size was large
Figure 1. Number of COVID-19-related tweets over the study period by tweet type. Dotted line is 20:00 (23 March 2020).
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suggesting a 91% increase in misinformation tweets
post-announcement, albeit highly uncertain in magni-
tude (95% confidence intervals (CIs) 1.014 to 3.610).
The Bayesian structural Time Series model estimates a
21% (95% credible intervals 33% to 9.6%)
change (i.e., decrease) in the number of misinformation
tweets following the announcement (over the total
period). This represents a total of 2428 fewer misinfor-
mation tweets 48 hours following the announcement
than would have been expected. The ARIMA model
also suggested a negative impact of the announcement
on trends in misinformation on Twitter (b¼46.469,
95% CIs 79.286 to 14.101).
Results for when data is analysed by minute of the
day demonstrate mixed associations (Online Appendix
Table A). Each model gives a different result, with the
negative binomial regression model suggesting an
increase in the number of misinformation tweets fol-
lowing the announcement, the Bayesian Structural
Time Series detecting no effect, and the ARIMA
model suggesting a decrease. No conclusive relation-
ships can therefore be derived from these analyses.
With trends in tweets from bots appearing to change
in relating to the national lockdown announcement in
Figure 1, we re-ran our analyses with the number of
tweets from bots as our outcome variable (Table 3).
The negative binomial regression model displayed a
positive association, with a 13.1% increase (95% CIs
1.049 to 1.220) in the number of tweets from bots fol-
lowing the announcement. No statistically significant
effect was detected for both the Bayesian Structural
Time Series and ARIMA models. Similar findings
were also displayed when running analyses at the
minute level (Online Appendix Table B), with the
only difference being a statistically significant positive
effect now observed in the ARIMA model (b¼ 5.972,
95% CIs 4.246 to 7.697).
Classifying misinformation throughout the period
Our final analysis classifies the types of tweets identi-
fied as misinformation. Following evaluation of model
performance, a four topic solution was selected (see
Online Appendix Figure B). The characteristics of the
four topics are displayed in Figure 2. We classified each
misinformation tweet as belonging to the topic with the
highest gamma value (i.e., likelihood of belonging to
each topic) to estimate their prevalence in our data. We
describe each of our four clusters, including adding
names to aid their interpretation:
1. Government and policy (22.5%): The common terms
and themes followed debate, evaluation and anger
towards government and policy decision making
Table 2. Effect of the announcement on the hourly trend for the number of misinformation tweets about COVID-19 (48-hour pre-
and post-announcement).
Model Estimate 95% Lower 95% Upper p
Negative binomial regression
Relative effect (IRR) 1.913 1.014 3.610 0.045
Bayesian Structural Time Series
Absolute effect 2428 3746 1098 0.001
Relative effect (%) 21% 33% 10% 0.001
ARIMA regression
Absolute effect (beta) 47 79 14 0.005
IRR: incidence rate ratio; ARIMA: Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average.
Table 3. Effect of the announcement on the hourly trend for the number of bots tweeting about COVID-19 (48-hour pre- and post-
announcement).
Model Estimate 95% Lower 95% Upper p
Negative binomial regression
Relative effect (IRR) 1.131 1.049 1.220 0.001
Bayesian Structural Time Series
Absolute effect 10,504 26,715 50,308 0.308
Relative effect (%) 2.4% 6.1% 11.0% 0.308
ARIMA regression
Absolute effect (beta) 330 36 595 0.077
IRR: incidence rate ratio; ARIMA: Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average.
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related to the pandemic. Discussion included a range
of topics about the National Health Service (NHS)
as well as the ability of the government to act and
control the virus. Some tweets were also critical or
blamed China for the pandemic as well.
2. Symptoms (31.5%): A range of topics were dis-
cussed within the cluster, with many centred on
symptoms of COVID-19. Common symptoms
included high ‘temperature’ and ‘cough’ as well as
some discussion of ways to minimise risk or aid
symptoms (e.g., ‘alcohol’ or ‘hand’). Tweets were
for both individuals discussing their own symptoms
or sharing information on incorrect ways to diag-
nose the disease.
3. Pushing back against misinformation (17.4%):
Tweets were often engaging with misinformation
directly flagging and critiquing, for instance, mis-
leading information. These included individuals
asking others to ‘take the disease or situation seri-
ously’, ‘stay at home’ or socially distance and
expressing disappointment at what was being
shared. Many tweets stressed the importance of
policy actions to help healthcare cope. While
tweets did not always represent harmful misinforma-
tion, tweets debunking misinformation ironically
can increase the likelihood that some false informa-
tion will be believed since they make it more salient
(e.g., by repeating it) or widening its circulation
(Schwarz et al., 2016).
4. Cures and treatments (28.6%): The final topic rep-
resented tweets discussing cures and treatments for
COVID-19. These included medicines being pushed
as effective remedies such as chloroquine as well as
preventative strategies both linked to transmitting
COVID-19 or the causes of the disease (e.g., sixth
most common term was ‘mobile’ reflecting
Figure 2. Top 20 most common terms found in four topics identified within COVID-19-related tweets. Numbers refer to the
specific clusters, with 1¼ government and policy, 2¼ symptoms, 3¼ pushing back against misinformation, and 4¼ cures and
treatments.
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discussion of links to 5G mobile phone masts).
Language was often emotive when describing these
topics (e.g., fourth most common term was ‘die’).
The eighth most common term was ‘trump’, reflect-
ing misinformation being shared by the US
President Donald Trump at the time.
Figure 3 presents trends in each topics over the
period. Topic 1 (‘government and policy’) was more
common during 22 March 2020, then following a con-
sistent trend otherwise. The topic displays a slight
increase in tweets following the announcement,
although in line with other short term increases over
the period and not consistent over the longer term.
Topic 2 (‘symptoms’) was fairly cyclical throughout
the period. While there was a small increase following
the announcement, the increase appears to follow sim-
ilar increases over the period and was not sustained.
Topic 3 (‘pushing back against misinformation’) was
the least frequent topic throughout the period, with a
consistent temporal pattern. Finally, topic 4 (‘cures and
treatments’) shows an increase immediately following
the announcement and this increase continues through-
out the 24 March 2020. Indeed by 03:00 on the 24
March 2020, it represented just over half of all tweets
identified as misinformation (although there were few
tweets during this period).
We repeated our time-series analyses to estimate the
effect of the announcement on trends in the topics
(Table 4). Here, we utilise the same model specifica-
tions as used previously and, however, use total
number of misinformation tweets as the offset or con-
trol rather than the total number of tweets. For topic 1
(‘government and policy’), a negative association was
detected in the Bayesian Structural Time Series model
suggesting fewer tweets for the topic post announce-
ment. The result contrasted with the other two
models were no associations was detected. Topic 2
(‘symptoms’) resulted in no effects observed in the
Bayesian Structural Time Series and ARIMA models,
with a negative effect observed in the Negative
Binomial regression model. Topic 3 (‘pushing back
against misinformation’) detected negative associations
in the Bayesian Structural Time Series and ARIMA
models (no association in the Negative Binomial
model), suggesting fewer tweets following the
announcement. Finally, a positive association was
detected for topic 4 (‘cures and treatments’) across all
Figure 3. Hourly trends in the number of misinformation tweets by topic. Dotted line is 20:00 (23 March 2020). Numbers refer to
the specific clusters, with 1¼ government and policy, 2¼ symptoms, 3¼ pushing back against misinformation, and 4¼ cures and
treatments.
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three models. The result suggests that the announce-
ment saw a significant increase in the number of mis-
information tweets related to ‘cures and treatments’,




Our study demonstrates a novel analysis of Big Data to
evaluate whether the announcement of the UK nation-
al lockdown had an impact on trends in the sharing of
misinformation on Twitter. While we found evidence
that there were more COVID-19-related tweets follow-
ing the policy announcement on national TV, we did
not find consistent evidence suggesting it also led to an
overall increase of misinformation being shared on
Twitter. Analyses of hourly tweets across three analyt-
ical models suggested there were fewer tweets with mis-
information post-announcement, although results were
mixed when analysing trends at the minute level. In
contrast, we found evidence of an increase in the
number of tweets from bots post-announcement; how-
ever, tweets from bots were also less likely to be shared
by users than normal tweets. We also present a novel
classification of tweets identified as misinformation
identifying four distinct topics: ‘government and
policy’, ‘symptoms’, ‘pushing back against misinforma-
tion’ and ‘cures and treatments’. While most types of
misinformation did not change or even decreased fol-
lowing the announcement, we found evidence for an
increase in misinformation about ‘cures and treat-
ments’ in the 48 hours following the announcement.
Interpretation
Our findings suggest that governments can be assured
that moments of policy communications may not be
immediately disrupted by misinformation overall. It
follows findings from other countries where most pop-
ulation groups, including those with low trust of the
government, clearly understood major policy messages
(Barari et al., 2020; Ofcom, 2020). Where major nation-
al announcements offer certainty in policy responses
and expectations, they may act specifically against the
lure of misinformation. Regular and clear messaging
from governments may therefore be encouraged
throughout pandemics. Public engagement and open-
ness in decision making can help to build trust (Pieczka
and Escobar, 2013). Such implications should be con-
sidered against possible message saturation that may
lead to disengagement (Baseman et al., 2013).
We find greater Twitter activity following the
national lockdown announcement, representing popu-
lations reacting to the broadcast. While this increase
in overall Twitter activity did not result in an increase
in misinformation overall, we did find an increase in
tweets from bots. This finding might be some cause for
concern in the sharing of policy announcements, given
Table 4. Effect of the announcement on the hourly trends for misinformation topics (48-hour pre- and post-announcement).
Topic Name Estimate Lower Upper p
Bayesian Structural Time Series (absolute values)
1 Government and policy 369 736 31 0.018
2 Symptoms 21 310 358 0.465
3 Pushing back against misinformation 411 614 218 0.001
4 Cures and treatments 800 581 1025 0.001
Bayesian Structural Time Series (relative (%) values)
1 Government and policy 16% 32% 1.3% 0.018
2 Symptoms 0.7% 10% 12% 0.465
3 Pushing back against misinformation 22% 32% 12% 0.001
4 Cures and treatments 33% 24% 42% 0.001
Negative binomial regression (IRR values)
1 Government and policy 1.077 0.879 1.320 0.474
2 Symptoms 0.581 0.510 0.661 <0.001
3 Pushing back against misinformation 0.838 0.700 1.004 0.0558
4 Cures and treatments 1.800 1.561 2.074 <0.001
ARIMA regression (beta values)
1 Government and policy 8.57 21.29 4.14 0.186
2 Symptoms 17.67 40.21 4.86 0.124
3 Pushing back against misinformation 9.02 15.15 2.88 0.004
4 Cures and treatments 16.29 3.94 28.64 0.010
IRR: incidence rate ratio; ARIMA: Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average.
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that bots are associated with sharing misinformation
about COVID-19 (Ferrara, 2020; Yang et al., 2020).
While tweets from bots were less likely to be shared
by others within our study, which may indicate they
were less problematic actors on social media, they
were also common which suggest a high scale of activ-
ity that could be harmful. Controlling the prevalence
and sharing abilities of bots may be an effective tool for
governments in reducing misinformation.
Clear policy announcements might be important but
are likely to only be one part of a suite of effective
policy actions. The every-changing and unprecedent
nature of COVID-19, much like any novel pandemic,
complicates the ability to monitor misinformation as
themes, issues and information may be changing rap-
idly. The dynamic nature of misinformation formats,
types and channels for sharing, as well as the difficulty
in controlling large quantities of information across the
internet, means developing effective strategies for dis-
rupting or inhibiting the spread of misinformation is
challenging (Larson, 2018; Swire-Thompson and
Lazer, 2020). We have little information and under-
standing of what we are dealing with, especially how
to effectively deal with it on a global scale that accounts
for multiple contexts. COVID-19 is not going to be the
last pandemic; we need to use this time to catch up to
the problem of misinformation in public health that we
have largely ignored or poorly understood so that we
can capitalise on it for the future (both for research and
policy).
The study period we use is focused on the immediate
time frame (i.e., 48 hours post-announcement) and
future research should consider the longer term impli-
cations. Trends in cases of misinformation are time-
relevant and often occur with short spikes over a few
days (De Santis et al., 2020; Gruzd and Mai, 2020;
Ofcom, 2020). The accumulation of posts, theories
and ideas over the longer term might result in popula-
tion responses that have public health implications
(e.g., promoting conspiracy theories) or the gradual
erosion of trust in policy efforts (Larson, 2018;
Pulido et al., 2020). Greater research is needed on the
longer term implications of misinformation on popula-
tions and public health as well as the timely evaluation
of the communication of public health strategies.
We present evidence of four distinct types of misin-
formation that can help to characterise the themes and
issues being discussed on social media. The topics
found largely match findings from other research
across different international contexts, displaying key
misinformation themes relating to COVID-19
(Evanega et al., 2020; Ferrara, 2020; Gruzd and Mai,
2020; Yang et al., 2020). Our analyses suggested that
there was an increase in tweets related to the topic
‘cures and treatment’ post-announcement. This may
represent individuals responding to the new national
restrictions seeking to share ‘opportunities’ to end it.
Given that many of the themes related to the topic can
be dangerous, this represents a key area for policy
makers to target. The ‘pushing back against misinfor-
mation’ topic was the least prevalent topic and declined
following the announcement. This may represent a
strategy governments could chose to focus their efforts
on through larger scale and co-ordinated social media
campaigns following key policy announcements. Such
a recommendation should be made cautiously, given
the mixed evidence on the effectiveness of educational
campaigns across public health issues (Kyriakidou
et al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2020; Schwarz et al.,
2016; Swire-Thompson and Lazer, 2020).
Our project provides a framework for how we can
utilise Big Data for the real-time monitoring and eval-
uation of how misinformation is being shared online in
relation to key policy moments. Capitalising on natural
experiments, as in our study, can help to build rigorous
evidence to guide the design and identification of effec-
tive interventions for tackling misinformation about
COVID-19. Our approach can also be applied to dif-
ferent outcomes and public health issues both within
and outside of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Limitations
The findings derived from our dataset might have lim-
ited wider generalisability. Twitter users are not repre-
sentative of the UK population, being over-represented
by younger age groups, males and individuals of higher
socio-economic status (Sloan, 2017). We only consider
one social media platform and extending our analysis
to incorporate other platforms that each have different
demographics and purposes will help to broaden the
generalisability of our results. Evidence suggests that
smaller platforms, such as Parler, might form ‘echo
chambers’ for sharing misinformation which has been
censored on other platforms (Cinelli et al., 2020). Such
relationships may be ignored when considering more
popular platforms, such as Twitter, limiting our
understanding.
While we followed similar approaches implemented
elsewhere for estimating whether tweets represented
misinformation (Cinelli et al., 2020; Vosoughi et al.,
2018), identifying misinformation in big datasets is dif-
ficult and our approach may be limited. For example,
we may have underestimated the scale of misinforma-
tion through not being able to capture general mislead-
ing comments, rumours or those not reported by fact
checking organisations (Swire-Thompson and Lazer,
2020). There is greater need for effective ways to cap-
ture the dynamically changing nature of misinforma-
tion that can help to support research and policy.
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Similarly, we also estimate whether Twitter users are
‘bots’ which may introduce some bias into our data.
While the approach we used has previously reported a
92% accuracy in classifying Twitter users as bots or not
(Kearney, 2018), there may be some error introduced
due to the classification model being trained on older
data than what we use.
Although our analyses are rigorous and utilise novel
time-series data, they can only tell us whether there was
an increase in misinformation. They do not consider
the mechanisms or networks through which misinfor-
mation may spread across social media. We do not
consider if different population groups responded dif-
ferently to lockdown announcement and were more or
less likely to share misinformation following it. While
these topics were beyond the scope of our study and
not covered in our study aim, they are arguable more
useful for identifying actionable strategies for minimis-
ing the spread and reach of misinformation. Future
research should consider evaluating these specific path-
ways and how they are affected or disrupted by key
policy announcements.
Conclusion
While the scale of misinformation being shared during
the COVID-19 pandemic is of significant public health
concern, our study presents evidence that key govern-
ment policy announcements may help to minimise mis-
information (at least in the immediate 48 hours
following). Our results do not mean that governments
should ignore the potential impact of misinformation
circulating on social media platforms during or before
key policy announcements. In particular, there appears
to have been an increase in dangerous misinformation
about ‘cures and treatment’. Rather, an agreed
approach is needed beyond the 48-hour timeline post
announcement for official outlets on social media plat-
forms (e.g., local authorities, government departments
and public health bodies) to coordinate and synchro-
nise their targeted messages in counteracting misinfor-
mation. It is a scenario which requires officials to
provide a balance between freedom of expression and
open public discourse, clear and consistent presenta-
tion of scientific evidence and the constant promotion
of reliable sources for pandemic information. If public
health messages are clear, consistent and part of an
agreed approach, this has a higher potential pushing
back against the infodemic.
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